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Following the lead of Sweden in 1997, 32 US cities have adopted Vision Zero policies that aim 
to eliminate all traffic deaths on their streets (Vision Zero Network 2017). After New York City in 
2012, numerous cities in the northeast and on the west coast have adopted such policies as a 
first step toward eliminating the tens of thousands of preventable deaths that occur in the US 
every year.  
 
Adding urgency to their cause is the fact that in the United States, the annual number of traffic 
fatalities has increased since 2011, after decreasing steadily for decades. Cities can target 
future investments by creating a High-Injury Network which identifies the city streets where the 
majority of severe injuries and fatalities occur.  
 
This paper examines the precedent of Vision Zero policies and High-Injury Networks 
established in US cities and around the world. It looks at varying approaches to analyzing and 
representing severe injury and fatality data while considering a number of challenges posed in 
implementing a High-Injury Network. It aims to address the following question: How does street 
design in Atlanta impact the incidence of severe injury and fatality in traffic collisions? 
 
II. Literature Review 
The following literature review addresses several questions regarding High-Injury Networks and 
the implications for adoption by the City of Atlanta: 
● What is the state of traffic fatalities globally, nationally, and in the state of 
Georgia? What trends can be observed? 
● What is Vision Zero? What is its purpose? 
● What is a High-Injury Network? What problem does it intend to solve? 
● What data are used to create a High-Injury Network? 
● What implementation and design responses are available to address conditions 
highlighted by a High-Injury Network? 
● What implementation challenges exist for cities, regions, and states? How do 
city, state, and regional policies impact one another? How might they 
complement or contradict each other? 
● How will this paper further research on High-Injury Networks and Vision Zero? 
 
A. Background 
In 2013, the World Health Organization reported that 1.24 million fatalities occur annually on the 
world’s roads, making traffic injuries the eighth leading cause of death globally (WHO 2013). 
This figure was expected to increase by 2030 without meaningful intervention, the report states, 
raising the possibility that traffic fatalities could soon become the world’s fifth leading cause of 
death. 
 
Traffic fatalities have decreased steadily in developed nations for decades, but since 2010 
traffic-related injuries and fatalities have plateaued in the United States (NHTSA 2017). In this 
regard, the United States is an outlier among developed nations, but that was not always the 
case. In 1994, 33% of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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countries saw higher a higher traffic fatality rate than the United States (OECD 2017); by 2015, 
the fatality rate of the United was the worst. In 1990, the United States and the Netherlands--
often seen as a pioneer in road safety for building infrastructure that supports non-motorized 
modes--saw an identical number of fatalities per million vehicles. Today, the fatality rate for 
Americans is twice that of the Dutch (OECD 2017). 
 
In 2016, 37,461 fatalities occurred on US roads, an increase of 5.6% from the year before 
(NHTSA 2016). Within the last few years, total fatalities have increased over historic lows in 
2011, with 2014 observing the largest single-year increase in fatalities in 50 years (NHTSA 
2017). The Center for Disease Control reports that between 2000 and 2010 motor vehicle 
crashes were the leading cause of death in the United States for people age five to thirty-four 
(CDC 2013).  
 
While all roadway users have seen higher fatalities since 2011, cyclists and pedestrians are 
particularly vulnerable. Bicyclist and pedestrian fatalities account for 17.3% of all roadway 
fatalities in 2015 (NHTSA). In 2009, those modes accounted for 10.9% of all trips (FHWA 2011), 
but 14% of all traffic fatalities (NHTSA).  
 
Trends in the state of Georgia have largely followed those nationally, with the state ranking 5th 
nationally in total number of traffic-related fatalities, while 8th in population (NHTSA 2017). For 
Georgia, 2015 represented a 21.2% increase in traffic fatalities from the year before (GOHS). In 
addition, the agency has set a target of 2,266 fatalities as its fatality target measure for 2018, a 
figure 58% higher than the number of fatalities observed in 2015 (GOHS). As a percentage of 
total fatalities, pedestrian fatalities in Georgia have increased since 2007, and in 2014 account 
for 14% of total traffic fatalities (GOHS). 
 
As shown in Table 1 below, pedestrian fatalities in Georgia have seen a sharp uptick since 2011 
despite following a downward trend for decades. NHTSA data indicate that as a percentage of 
total fatalities, the proportion of those killed outside a vehicle (motorcyclists, pedestrians, 
bicyclists) is at its highest point since 1975, accounting for 33% of all fatalities. These data 
indicate that while progress has been made at protecting vehicle occupants, more needs to be 
done to ensure the safety of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists.  
  




B. What is Vision Zero? What is its purpose? 
In order to address these preventable deaths, 32 US cities have adopted Vision Zero policies 
that aim to eliminate all traffic-related deaths. As a policy, Vision Zero attempts to reframe the 
understanding of traffic collisions by looking not at individual behavior, but at the entire 
transportation system within which fatalities and severe injuries occur.  
 
Part of this distinction can be observed in efforts to substitute “crash” or “collision” for “accident” 
in transportation terminology. “Accident” implies limited responsibility and suggests that little 
prevention was possible. 
 
Figure 2. Map of current Vision Zero cities as designated by the Vision Zero Network. 
(https://visionzeronetwork.org/resources/vision-zero-cities/) 
 
The traditional response to why traffic collisions occur focuses on driver behavior and 
culpability. According to research by Evans and others, road users’ errors are identified as 
contributing or primary factors in 90% of crashes (Evans 1996). Vision Zero policies attempt to 
reframe that understanding by taking a more system-wide perspective to consider the broader 
factors, policies, and designs that account for the large and increasing number of fatalities and 
severe injuries observed in the United States (McAndrews 2013). Rather than locating blame 
solely with parties involved in the crash, McAndrews argues, “[We] could instead ask how the 
transportation system might have failed to protect people who made predictable errors” (ibid). 




McAndrews notes that the rationale from re-framing collisions in a systemic and collective way 
is that “it offers a larger set of ways to organize the infrastructure, operations, and institutions of 
the road transportation system around injury prevention” (2013). Vision Zero policies also look 
to assert shared responsibility for ensuring a safer transportation system. From the Vision Zero 
perspective, traffic safety is not the sole province of traffic engineers, but includes perspectives 
from public health, transportation, planning, and advocacy organizations. Instead of attempting 
to reduce and mitigate unpredictable “accidents,” Vision Zero looks to assert shared 
responsibility for eliminating preventable deaths.  
 
 
C. What is a High Injury Network? What problem does it intend to solve? 
Along with adopting Vision Zero policies, many US cities have identified the need to collect and 
analyze data that indicates where fatalities and severe injuries occur. Several cities have done 
so by creating a High Injury Network that identifies the city streets that account for the majority 
of traffic-related deaths and severe injuries (both Chicago and Portland use similar maps for 
their streets called a “High Crash Network”).  
 
As a part of its Vision Zero policy adopted in 2014, the City of San Francisco created a High 
Injury Network that identified the 12% of city streets that accounted for more than 70% of its 
severe and fatal traffic injuries (SFMTA 2015). The purpose of doing so, the plan states, is to 
prioritize where future investments on streets and intersections will have the biggest impact in 
reducing the number of severe injuries and fatalities. 
 
 




In the most recent update to its High Injury Network methodology, the San Francisco 
Department of Public Health describes the network as “a snapshot in time (2013-2015) of where 
severe and fatal injuries are most concentrated” (SFDPH 2017). The report also contrasts its 
methodology with a more risk-based analysis, “[t]he Vision Zero High Injury Network provides 
information regarding the streets where injuries, particularly severe and fatal, are concentrated 
in San Francisco based on injury counts; it is not an assessment of whether a street or 
particular location is dangerous” (ibid 2017).  
 
The authors seek to distinguish their methodology which focuses on counts, from rates (which 
would take into account some measure of “exposure,” that is, dividing the number of injuries by 
pedestrian or vehicle volumes or population). This distinction is telling and may exist for several 
reasons: 
1) Vision Zero is less interested in changes of degree or improved rates. Most Vision Zero 
policies are clear that there is no other acceptable number of preventable deaths.  
2) Data limitations—Exposure measures (particularly pedestrian volumes) are difficult and 
costly to obtain. 
3) Legal liability—Asserting that an intersection is dangerous could be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement of legal liability on the part of the city and its agencies. In that sense, 
SFDPH, SFMTA and the City of San Francisco walk a fine line between identifying areas 
in need of intervention in line with Vision Zero’s goals of taking a systems approach to 
safety without assuming legal liability for future fatalities or severe injuries.  
 
D. What data are used to create a HIN?  
Police crash reports are the primary dataset used by cities to identify crash locations that make 
up a High Injury Network. In most states, crash data are recorded electronically by officers at 
the scene of the collision and are stored electronically in a statewide database. Some 
challenges with using this data source are that it is not publicly accessible, it may lack detail 
about the collision that could  inform future analyses, it includes inaccurate location information, 
or it is not available in a timely manner (City of Los Angeles). Portland’s High Crash Network 
methodology notes that there is often a significant delay (more than a year) in when the state 
DOT makes complete information available (City of Portland). Interviews with officials at the 
Atlanta Regional Commission for this analysis also indicate that even when data are available, 
they require cleaning, standardizing, and post-processing (Rushing 2017). 
 
How reliable are the data? 
Recent studies indicate that many crashes, approximately 30%, go unreported (M. Davis & Co. 
2015). While the majority of unreported crashes are property-damage-only collisions, a study by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration indicated that of all unreported crashes, 
approximately 10% of injury-crashes are not reported to police (ibid.). Earlier studies indicate a 
slightly higher number of collisions resulting in injury, 13.5%, are unreported (Greenblatt et al. 
1981). 
 
In a 1999 study of 13 countries (including the U.S.), Elvik and Mysen note that collision- 
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reporting was shown to be incomplete at all levels of severity but that the more severe the 
injury, the more likely the event was reported (Elvik et al. 1999). Their results show that mean 
reporting levels for the 13 countries were 95% for fatal injuries, 70% for serious injuries 
(admitted to hospital), 25% for slight injuries (treated as outpatients), and 10% for very slight 
injuries (treated outside hospitals).  Their results also show that only 49% of hospital-treated 
injury collisions in the United States are reported in official road collision statistics and that 
reporting tends to be highest for car occupants and lowest for cyclists (ibid.). 
 
In order to address the need for more complete injury data, the San Francisco Department of 
Public Health recently released an update to its High Injury Network that includes mapped 
hospital injury data along with police injury data. In doing so, San Francisco is the first city in the 
country to use hospital data to identify unreported traffic injuries (SFDPH 2017). While this data 
source holds promise for creating a more accurate picture of the injuries taking place on city 
streets, there are challenges with obtaining and using hospital data. Portland’s High Crash 
Network Methodology notes “The Oregon Trauma Registry (OTR) offered a promising dataset 
of serious injuries; however the data was difficult to match with crash data because of its focus 
on health data, while ODOT [Oregon DOT] focuses on crash characteristics” (Portland 2016). In 
addition, concerns over patient privacy have limited usage of hospital datasets. Following the 
lead of San Francisco, it is likely that other cities will incorporate hospital injury data into their 
methods along with other possible data sources, like collision data from insurance companies, 
and bicycle collision data collected from local bike shops (a current research topic of Dr. Kari 
Watkins at the Georgia Institute of Technology).  
 
The use of hospital data sets holds promise because of the results shown in San Francisco. In 
using hospital-reported injury data from Zuckerberg San Francisco General (ZSFG), San 
Francisco Department of Public Health (SFDPH) and San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency (SFMTA) found that 27.7% of pedestrian severe injuries were not included in SFPD 
data, 33.1% of bicyclist severe injuries were not included, and 39.1% of vehicle severe injuries 
were not included (SFDPH 2017). 
 
In addition to allowing the agencies to account for what would have been unreported injuries, its 
methodology also used a clinical assessment of severe injury rather than relying on SFPD-
reported assessment of severity. Doing so led to a net increase of 361 severe injuries, roughly 
50% more injuries than what were previously identified as severe (SFDPH 2017).  
 
What variations exist in the methodologies used to map injury data and create a HIN? 
As a tool, High Injury Networks are relatively new instruments cities use to reach their Vision 
Zero goals and in the case of San Francisco and other cities, they are a resource that reflects 
the effort and involvement of multiple city agencies and departments (Public Health, 
Transportation Agency, Planning and Public Works). But researchers and transportation 
departments have used other tools like statistically based risk-estimation methods that identify 




An analysis by Pulugurtha et al. (2007) identifies commonly used methods to create rankings of 
high-crash zones and recommends a new method to compare and prioritize high-crash areas. 
The study also notes the need for a more refined and less subjective process to identify such 
zones in the first place. The authors note that methods such as crash frequency, crash density, 
and crash rate are commonly used measures to indicate needed intervention.  
● Crash frequency is a count of crashes within a given time period in which each event is 
given equal weight. An extension of this method would be to apply a weight for crashes 
based on severity.  
● Crash density normalizes crash frequency by a given area (e.g. crashes per ¼ mile) but 
doesn’t take into account pedestrian or vehicular volumes 
● Crash rate accounts for volumes by using an “exposure” measure (usually based on 
average annual daily traffic, population, or observed vehicle/pedestrian counts) 
 
Such methods, the authors argue, offer varying results and introduce subjectivity on the part the 
analyst that could be reduced by using a method they introduce called a “crash score” (ibid.). 
The authors note that one particular challenge with the crash rate measure is that exposure 
metrics for non-vehicular modes are not readily available and tend to be both costly and time-
consuming to obtain (ibid.). The authors recommend that a possible alternative exposure metric 
would be to use population data for workers or residents within the zone that could serve as a 
surrogate measure of pedestrian activity (ibid.). 
 
Pulugurtha et al. (2007) recommend a composite metric using the three commonly used 
methods noted above (crash frequency, crash density, and crash rate) that is also normalized 
by each individual method’s maximum score. The authors argue that this method could be a 
less subjective way for cities and public agencies to prioritize areas in need of intervention.  
While this method might help analysts compare and prioritize individual zones, it offers little 
guidance as to how to identify high crash zones in the first place. The authors note, “Identifying 
high pedestrian crash zones based on the density map was done manually...Software 
developments in the future could perhaps help automate this process even further” (ibid. 2007). 
 
Other approaches have been to assess the risk of pedestrian collisions by using statistical 
methods that consider the likelihood of collisions based on built environment characteristics. 
This method often produces somewhat counter-intuitive results in that pedestrian amenities like 
marked crosswalks are often correlated with increased risk of pedestrian collisions. In a study of 
Seattle using collision data from 2007 to 2013, Quistberg et al. showed the following: 
● Locations with traffic signals had twice the collision rate of locations without a 
signal and those with marked crosswalks also had a higher rate.  
● Locations with a marked crosswalk also had higher risk of collision. 
●  Locations with a one-way road or those with signs encouraging motorists to 
cede the right-of-way to pedestrians had fewer pedestrian collisions.  
● Collision rates were higher in locations that encourage greater pedestrian activity 





San Francisco High Injury Network Methodology 
Along with using innovative methods for collecting data described above, San Francisco uses a 
network approach to identifying high-crash areas in the city as described above (SFDPH 2017). 
As with the composite method used by Pulugurtha, an initial step in San Francisco’s 
methodology is to geocode each injury and fatality using GIS software (Kronenberg 2014). The 
next step in the agency’s methodology is to assign each injury to an intersection and the 
adjoining street segments, and weighting severe injury and fatalities counts by three (ibid). 
Corridors are then summarized by corridor length, fatalities/severe injuries per mile, total injuries 
per mile, and weighted injuries per mile. A threshold weighted count of nine injuries or greater 
was used to determine inclusion in the city’s High Injury Network. Kronenberg et al. note that 
summarizing collision data by corridors “mitigates inherent year-by-year variability in collision 
data at a specific location and facilitates pedestrian safety measures that are more effectively 
implemented on corridors, such as road diets and speed control measures” (ibid.).  
 
 
Figure 5 and 6. San Francisco Vision Zero High Injury Network 2015 (right) and 2017 (left) 
 
Portland’s High Crash Network Methodology 
The City of Portland released its Vision Zero plan in December of 2016 and applies what it calls 
a High Crash Network to determine the city streets most in need of intervention. Unlike San 
Francisco, Portland’s methodology document states that the streets included in its High Crash 
Network are its most dangerous (City of Portland 2016). Its methodology for determining what 
streets are included also varies. Its first step, the methodology document states, is to identify 
high crash streets for pedestrians, bicyclists, and vehicles separately and create a high crash 
network for each. The bicycle and pedestrian crash networks are then combined with the 
vehicle-crash network if vehicle collisions resulted in a fatality or severe injury (City of Portland 
2016). The composite high crash network also incorporates region’s Communities of Concern 
Index to prioritize investment in underserved neighborhoods. 
 
Where San Francisco focused on blocks and their adjoining intersections, Portland separates its 
analysis into corridors and intersections, defining corridors as all street segments that share a 
name. Figure 6, below, shows Portland’s High Crash Network contrasted with San Francisco’s 
High Injury Network. One obvious difference is that Portland’s network features a few long 
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corridors, while San Francisco’s network features many smaller segments (some only a few 
blocks long).  
 
 
Figure 7 and 8. Portland’s High Crash Network, 2016 (left) and San Francisco’s High Injury Network, 2017 (right) 
 
Another difference between the two networks is the time span each city uses; Portland’s 
network uses a decade of crash data, while San Francisco’s update uses only three years’ 
worth. In an interview with Byron Rushing, the Atlanta Regional Commission’s Bicycle and 
Pedestrian Planner, he recommended using a dataset of three years, because a longer 
timeframe that uses less recent data would likely include travel patterns that are no longer 
relevant (Rushing 2017).  
 
Other Methodologies 
In an analysis for Los Angeles DOT’s High Injury Network, Richer et al. note that considering 
the relative novelty of High Injury Networks as a tool for cities, high variability exists between 
their methodologies. How injuries and fatalities are weighted along with how locations are 
designated, whether by intersection, adjoining blocks, or miles-long corridors, depends on the 





Seattle DOT Identifies priority corridors based on a crash rate of total crashes per 
million vehicles entering the corridor. Priority corridors are defined as 1.5 
standard deviations above the City’s mean collision rate. Seattle is also 
unique among many US cities in that it receives collision data directly 
from from the Seattle Police Department and maintains its database of 
collision records at the city level  
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Chicago DOT Prioritizes high-crash corridors based on the total number of pedestrian 
crashes per mile, with fatal and severe injury crashes receiving higher 
weight than other crash types. 
New York City 
DOT 
Identifies corridors ranked by pedestrian fatalities/severe injuries per 




E. What implementation and design responses are available to address conditions 
highlighted by a high injury network? 
 
Leah Shahum, a leader in the Vision Zero movement in the United States and former Executive 
Director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition has studied the efforts of Germany, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands to identify the strategies those countries use that account for the progress 
they have made toward achieving Vision Zero goals. She notes that of all the possible strategies 
to reduce fatalities, none is more important than reducing speeds. “In all three of these 
countries,” she writes, “the leaders of traffic safety efforts emphasize that managing speed is the 
#1 determinant in their successes in improving safety” (Shahum 2015).  
 
Many Vision Zero policies refer to studies that show the likelihood of pedestrian fatality 
increases dramatically with the speed of the striking vehicle. A frequently cited study by Tefft 
from 2011 points to the role that higher vehicle speeds play in pedestrian fatalities (Tefft, 2011). 
Tefft notes that pedestrians struck by a vehicle travelling at 17 mph have a 90% chance of 
survival, but that likelihood decreases to 50% for pedestrians struck by vehicles travelling at 33 
mph, and 10% for vehicles travelling at 48 mph (ibid).  
 
An important consideration, Shahum notes, are speed differentials between vehicles and other 
road users. Shahum argues that areas which see a mix of people moving at different speeds 
(i.e. walking, bicycling, and driving), should have lower vehicle speeds to accommodate that 
mix. In addition to slower vehicle speeds, she suggests that street design--separating vehicles 
from cyclists and pedestrians--and engineering, rather than education and enforcement, have 
had a greater impact in preventing severe injuries and fatalities (2015).  
 
In preparing its High Injury Network, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation reviewed 
Vision Zero efforts from four peer agencies (NYC DOT, Chicago DOT, Seattle DOT, and Florida 
DOT). In addition to identifying various methodologies for creating their High Injury Network, the 
analysis also showed that implementation strategies to reduce pedestrian fatalities and injuries 
vary by agency. Those implementation efforts, along with the five strategies identified by the 






Agency High Injury Network Countermeasure Focus 
New York City DOT Reducing speeds through automated enforcement, re-timing 
signals, aggressive ticketing, lowering speed limits and installing 
additional speed limit signs 
Seattle DOT Reducing speeds by implementing road diets and lane narrowing. 
Additional countermeasures identified on a case-by-case basis  
Chicago DOT Changing street cross-sections by using road diets and targeting 
intersections by modifying signals 
Denver DOT Multimodal street design, parking restrictions, leading pedestrian 
interval, reducing speed limits and installing median refuge 
 
Portland’s Vision Zero documents provide a more graphic representation of specific 
countermeasures that could help prevent severe injuries and fatalities that largely focus on 
reducing speeds and providing infrastructure that supports pedestrians and bicyclists (City of 








Figure 10. Portland Vision Zero Action Plan. Examples of Street Safety Design Elements 
 
Crash Reduction Factors 
The Los Angeles DOT identified some of the most effective countermeasures available by using 
the Federal Highway Administration’s Toolbox of Countermeasures and Their Potential 
Effectiveness for Pedestrian Crashes. The most effective interventions and their corresponding 
Crash Reduction Factors (CRF), that is, the amount by which certain types of collisions have 
been reduced using a given intervention, are shown below.  
 
Intervention Crash Reduction Factor 
Pedestrian Countdown Timers - signal that 
counts down crossing time in place of 
WALK/DON’T WALK signal 
Reduced pedestrian collisions by between 
52% and 70% 
Protected Left-turn Phase Conversion -  99% reduction in left-turn collisions 
Pedestrian Scramble - All-way stop for 
vehicles to allow pedestrians to cross in all 
directions 
35% reduction in pedestrian collisions 
Optimize Signal Timing for Bicyclist - Timing 
signals for speeds of 15-20 miles per hour 
Reduced pedestrian and bicyclist injury 
collisions by 37% 
Pedestrian Refuge Islands/Raised Medians - 
Installed medians in the middle of the roadway 
to shorten pedestrian crossing distances 
 56% reduction in pedestrian collisions 
(refuge island); 46% reduction in 
pedestrian collisions (raised median and 
marked crosswalk) 
Raised Pedestrian Crossing/Raised 
Crosswalk - Pedestrian street crossings raised 
to sidewalk level 
36% reduction in fatal and injury collisions 
for all modes 
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Road Diet - Change roadway cross-section 
from 4 lanes to 3 
Reduced all collisions by 29% 
Separated Bike Lane/Cycle Track - cycling 
facilities separated from traffic by a physical 
barrier 
95% decrease in risk of bicyclist injury 
(compared to streets without bicycling 
infrastructure) 
Separated shared-use path - off-street path for 
cyclists and pedestrians 
88% decrease in risk of injury for children; 
86% decrease in risk of injury for adults 
(compared to on-street bicycling) 
Improved Lighting - consistent placement of 
streetlights, pedestrian scale lighting at 
crosswalks 
27% reduction in injury across all modes 
(intersection lighting) 
23% reduction in injury collisions across 
all modes (corridor lighting) 
Parking Restrictions Near 
Intersections/Daylighting - remove parking 
spaces to improve sightlines for drivers and 
pedestrians 
30% reduction in pedestrian collisions 
HAWK signal - pedestrian-activated crossing 
light 
69% reduction in vehicle/pedestrian 
collisions 
High-visibility Crosswalk - distinct pavement 
markings (continental zebra or ladder pattern) 
48% reduction in pedestrian collisions 
 
F. What implementation challenges exist for cities, regions, and states? How do city, 
state, and regional policies impact one another? How might they complement or 
contradict each other? 
 
McAndrews notes that Vision Zero calls for reframing our understanding of traffic collisions in 
order to take shared responsibility for reducing fatalities and severe injuries. She notes that the 
tension between mobility and accessibility makes implementing Vision Zero a challenge, “calling 
for slower speeds is in conflict with traditional transportation planning strategies that emphasize 
mobility and traditional claims that higher traffic speeds are necessary to increase access to 
activities and markets (i.e., through lowering the time cost of accessibility)” (2015). While few 
would take issue with the goal of reducing fatalities, many object to countermeasures that limit 
the mobility of some in order to improve the safety for others. In other words, adopting a Vision 
Zero policy is one thing, but implementing countermeasures that would make it a reality is 
something else. McAndrews also notes that the traditional traffic engineering culture may not be 
quick to assume responsibility for what they see as the mistakes of others.  
 
Funding is one of the first hurdles cities must overcome in order to make Vision Zero a reality. 
Because many of the countermeasures cities identify in their Vision Zero policies address street 
design and engineering interventions, cities often list funding for those interventions as a top 
priority. Considering the recommendations offered by Portland in the images above, none come 
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without hard costs. To address a lack of funding available for Vision Zero efforts, Portland voters 
approved a city gas tax to generate $64 million over four years to support interventions targeting 
areas on its High Crash Network (Portland 2016). 
 
Georgia receives funds from the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) for the purpose 
of reducing the number of crashes and addressing common crash types (GDOT/PEDS 2017). 
This funding purpose comes into conflict with Vision Zero goals in that some Vision Zero 
implementation may in fact increase the number of crashes while reducing the number of 
fatalities. In its review of safety countermeasures, the Los Angeles DOT notes, 
Rather than focus on reducing the incidence of all collisions, the City will prioritize its 
efforts on the types of collisions that are more likely to result in a severe or fatal injury. 
Therefore, an intersection with fewer serious and fatal injuries, even if there are more 
total crashes, is an acceptable outcome of Vision Zero interventions. 
In that sense, state policies that look to reduce crashes may be at odds with Vision Zero that 
look to reduce deaths and severe injuries.  
 
While Vision Zero policies have been largely a city-level effort in this country, many states have 
put forward a goal of Toward Zero Deaths. As of 2012, 30 states (including Georgia) mention 
the objective of zero deaths in their State Highway Safety Plans (Munnich et al. 2012).  Munnich 
et al. indicate that for some states the goal may exist in name only, “In some cases, the mission, 
vision, or goal of zero deaths is mentioned only once or twice in SHSP, while in other cases it 
appears regularly and clearly informs aggressive, collaborative safety programs” (ibid). In a 
2012 analysis of states with that included language about zero deaths in their State Highway 
Safety Action Plans, only four states met all five criteria Munnich et al. considered to indicate a 
substantive Toward Zero Death (TZD) policy (ibid). Unlike more locally driven Vision Zero 
efforts, many seemingly parallel efforts by states with the goal of Toward Zero Deaths lack 
crucial details about specific metrics and infrastructure improvements.  
 
In addition to funding and policy challenges, Vision Zero efforts also face legal challenges when 
it comes to implementing interventions. The Georgia Pedestrian Safety Action Plan identifies the 
legal limitations within the state of Georgia to adopting some of the countermeasures aimed at 
reducing speeds (GDOT/PEDS). It notes that the state code prohibits the use of automated 
speed enforcement devices (GA Code § 40-14-2) and limits the implementation of installing red 
light cameras by capping the fine at $75 (GA Code § 40-14-20) making the cost of such devices 
outweigh the revenue produced by such fines and therefore prohibitively expensive in some 
cases (ibid).  
 
Other cities have had to address the challenge of amending state legislation to achieve their 
Vision Zero goals. In many states, cities cannot reduce the speed limits of their streets below a 
specified threshold. In New York City, Mayor Bill de Blasio worked with New York State 
legislators to authorize legislation allowing the city to lower its speed limits from 30 miles per 
hour to 25 because, as the city’s one-year update on Vision Zero notes: “People hit by a car 





G. How will this paper further research on High Injury Networks and Vision Zero? 
 
Traffic safety data is the primary source of our knowledge about the traffic safety environment, 
human behavior and vehicle performance. Therefore, in order to address these safety problems, 
we require good data, meaning data [that] are timely, accurate, complete, uniform, integrated 
and accessible.  
-Federal Highway Administration, Crash Data Improvement Guide, 2010 
 
 
While 32 US cities have adopted Vision Zero policies and many have created High Injury 
Networks to identify the city streets that account for the highest rates of death and severe injury, 
the City of Atlanta has done neither.  
 
This paper will offer City of Atlanta officials, public health officials, Department of Public Works 
and Department of Planning leaders recommendations about how to reduce the many traffic-
related severe injuries and fatalities that occur on Atlanta’s streets every year. Its primary 
contribution will be to provide easily accessible and comprehensible data to inform future 
transportation investments.  
 
This paper will offer a data-driven example to city officials of how to identify the city streets that 
account for a majority of deaths and severe injury. In doing so, it will inform future decisions 
about where to target infrastructure funding aimed at reducing severe injuries and fatalities. It 
will also offer leaders the opportunity to learn from implementation of Vision Zero policies in 
other cities and provide a guide for how to implement needed investments. In addition, it will 
serve as a model to neighboring jurisdictions by offering a local example of how they might 
create a High Injury Network in support of Vision Zero goals.  
 
It will inform other parallel efforts aimed at promoting traffic safety. As a supplement to its Walk. 
Bike. Thrive! plan, the Atlanta Regional Commission is developing its regional Bicycle and 
Safety Action Plan to identify needed projects to improve safety across the region. While varying 
in scope, this paper will likely identify similar locations in need of investment.  
 
This paper will also help make the case for countermeasures aimed at reducing speeding, 





In order to identify the streets where the majority of severe and fatal injury crashes occur, 
individual crashes (which exist as geocoded points with a latitude and longitude in the crash 
database) need be assigned to appropriate streets which exist as lines in a geographic 
information system (GIS). Assigning crashes to streets allows for the creation of additional 
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variables in the streets attribute table, among them: number of crashes, number of fatalities, 
number of severe injuries, fatalities and severe injuries per mile, etc.  
 
Once each crash has been assigned to an individual street, it is possible to summarize which 
streets are responsible for the majority of severe and fatal injury crashes—and what percent of 
severe and fatal injury crashes occur on a given percentage of the city’s total street network.  
 
Geocoded crashes were downloaded from the Georgia Electronic Accident Reporting System 
(GEARS) and loaded in ArcGIS along with a street centerline shapefile from the Atlanta 
Regional Commission. The GEARS query selected for crashes from 2014 through 2016 for 
Fulton and DeKalb counties that were reported to have a fatality or a severe injury in the crash 
report. Figure 1, below, shows a total of 4316 crashes in Fulton and DeKalb counties, from 2014 
to 2016. Figure 2 shows all of the crashes that occurred within the Atlanta city limits, indicating a 
clear delineation of crashes on the interstates and limited access highways, like GA400 and 









Figure 12. Severe and Fatal Injury Crashes in Atlanta, 2014-2016 
 
 
Following the methodologies of other High-Injury Networks looking to identify only surface 
streets, crashes that included a freeway identifier in the attribute table for crash location (“I85”, 
“I75”, “I285” ,“I20”, etc.) were removed from the analysis. A separate streets feature class was 
created after removing those streets with a functional classification of “freeway”, “expressway”, 
“interstate” or “entrance/exit ramp”. Both streets and crashes were clipped by the City of Atlanta 




Of the 660 fatal or severe injury crashes within the city limits (after removing those reported to 
occur on an interstate), 68 showed zero values in the attribute table for fatalities or severe 
injuries. Correspondence with GEARS technical support indicated that such occurrences likely 
resulted from data entry error on the part of the reporting officer and that individual crash reports 
would provide further detail about crash outcomes. As a result, 38 crashes were manually re-
coded to reflect severe injury or fatality data included in the crash report as accurately as it 
could be interpreted. Review of the remaining 30 crash reports were determined to not include a 
severe injury or fatality and were therefore removed from the analysis. 
 
Attributes in the street centerline feature class were dissolved on the “Label” attribute to 
aggregate small street segments into longer, continuous corridors that share a common name, 
rather than one composed of isolated segments. The rationale for doing so was to create a 
continuous high-injury network that corresponds to both users’ lived experience of the street 
network and the scope of infrastructure improvement projects. A spatial join was performed to 
assign each street (line) to the closest crash (point) so that within the crash attribute table, a 
column was added identifying the closest street.  
 
The crash attribute table was grouped by street name using a pivot table to identify the total 
number of fatalities and injuries that occurred on streets sharing a common name. A weighted 
injury field was created that summed total severe injuries with three times the number of 
fatalities. The crash attribute table was then joined to the street centerline shapefile on the 
common field of street name (“Label”) in ArcGIS. Using the distance field from the street 
centerline feature class, a weighted injuries per mile variable was created.   
 
A threshold for inclusion in the High-Injury Network was determined based on two variables: 
weighted injuries per mile and total weighted injuries. Any street with a total weighted injuries 
score about 3 and a weighted injuries per mile score above 3 was included in the High-Injury 
Network. Some cities’ HIN methodologies include only a weighted injuries per mile threshold. It 
was necessary to include total weighted injuries so as not to bias very small segments with few 






Figure 13. Distribution of Fatalities by Percent of Atlanta Street Miles 
 
The figure above identifies the percentage of Atlanta’s street network and a corresponding 
percentage of severe injuries (shown in yellow) and fatalities (shown in red). It shows that all 
fatalities and severe injuries are accounted for by roughly 25% of the street network 
(approximately 400 miles of Atlanta streets). A narrower threshold for the High-Injury Network 
helps identify where the city can target infrastructure improvements to get “the most bang for its 
buck”. The two factors for determining the threshold (>3 weighted injury sum and >3 weighted 
injuries per mile) correspond to 7.3% of the city’s street network. 
 
IV. Results 
The City of Atlanta High-Injury Network is shown in the figure below. The network identifies 
7.3% of Atlanta’s streets that account for 88% of fatalities, and 59% of severe injuries. Totaling 
84 streets and 123 centerline miles, the network accounts for 66 fatalities and 452 severe 
injuries that occurred on Atlanta streets between 2014 and 2016. As shown in the figure below, 
clusters of high-injury streets are shown in the city’s south and west sides, along with several 
streets in midtown and downtown. In fact, roughly two-thirds of the High-Injury Network is 
located west of Northside Drive and south of I-20, communities with higher black and low-











A ranking of the ten streets that received the highest weighted injury score (severe injuries + 3x 
fatalities) is shown below. The streets below account for one-third of the fatalities that 
occurred on Atlanta streets during the study period, despite constituting less than 3% of the 
















SE 4.46 8.07 36 24 4 0.27% 2.75% 5.33% 
Donald Lee 
Hollowell Pkwy 
NW 6.45 4.81 31 19 4 0.65% 4.93% 10.67% 
Martin Luther 
King Jr Dr SW 6.58 4.56 30 24 2 1.05% 7.68% 13.33% 
R.D. Abernathy 
Blvd SW 3.99 7.27 29 20 3 1.29% 9.98% 17.33% 
Cascade Rd SW 4.30 6.75 29 23 2 1.55% 12.61% 20.00% 
Campbellton 
Rd SW 7.19 3.48 25 19 2 1.98% 14.79% 22.67% 
Metropolitan 
Pkwy SW 4.87 4.72 23 8 5 2.27% 15.71% 29.33% 
Joseph E Boone 
Blvd NW 4.01 4.98 20 14 2 2.51% 17.32% 32.00% 
10th St NW 1.54 12.35 19 19 0 2.60% 19.50% 32.00% 
Table 1. Top Ten High-Injury Network Streets by Weighted Injury (Severe Injuries + 3x Fatalities) 
 
The ten streets listed above provide Atlanta leaders and policy makers with an even more 
actionable list of where to target future infrastructure improvements. Appropriate 
countermeasures implemented on the 47 miles of streets shown above would likely result in the 
sharpest reduction of fatalities and severe injuries on Atlanta’s streets.  
 
How Do Atlanta Neighborhoods with High-Injury Network Streets Differ from Those 
Without? 
 
Further analysis of socioeconomic characteristics of Atlanta block groups shows disparities 
between neighborhoods with High-Injury Network streets compared to those without. Using 
ArcGIS, each Atlanta census block group was given the total street mileage of the High-Injury 
Network within its borders. The characteristics of block groups with HIN streets were then 
compared to those without HIN streets.  
 
For Atlanta’s political leadership to better understand the disproportionate impact of the High-
Injury Network, total HIN mileage was summarized by Atlanta City Council District and 
Neighborhood Planning Unit (NPU). Table 2 below identifies the total mileage of the network 
located within each city council district. It shows that Districts 12, 4, and 3 have the most total 
mileage of HIN streets. Close to half of the entire High-Injury Network is located in those three 
city council districts. Column E shows the length of HIN streets within each district normalized 
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by the total mileage of streets within that district (column B divided by column D). This indicates 
that District 4 has the highest percentage of streets that are HIN streets (i.e.15% of all streets in 
District 4 are High-Injury Network streets).  
 
 
Table 2. High-Injury Network Distribution by Atlanta City Council District 
 
 






C. % of 
Total HIN 
in District D. Total Streets
E. % of District 
Streets on HIN 
1 10.0 8.1% 140.8 7.1%
2 10.4 8.4% 95.8 10.9%
3 15.9 12.9% 123.9 12.8%
4 17.7 14.3% 117.8 15.0%
5 4.2 3.4% 129.1 3.3%
6 6.0 4.9% 114.5 5.3%
7 8.2 6.6% 106.4 7.7%
8 4.3 3.5% 179.2 2.4%
9 6.8 5.5% 181.9 3.7%
10 9.5 7.7% 133.7 7.1%
11 10.6 8.6% 161.3 6.6%
12 19.7 16.0% 165.6 11.9%
Sum 123.3 100% 1649.9
NPU HIN Miles % of HIN Total Miles % NPU Streets on HIN
A 0.9 0.7% 90.9 1.0%
B 9.3 7.5% 134.0 6.9%
C 0.4 0.3% 74.0 0.5%
D 0.0 0.0% 64.5 0.0%
E 14.7 11.8% 96.1 15.3%
F 4.3 3.5% 71.8 6.0%
G 0.7 0.6% 49.8 1.5%
H 3.1 2.5% 55.4 5.6%
I 8.9 7.2% 93.0 9.5%
J 6.3 5.1% 58.9 10.7%
K 3.2 2.6% 36.2 8.9%
L 4.4 3.6% 30.5 14.5%
M 10.1 8.1% 79.0 12.7%
N 4.4 3.5% 64.0 6.8%
O 1.5 1.2% 57.7 2.6%
P 3.4 2.7% 81.1 4.2%
Q 0.8 0.7% 12.4 6.7%
R 5.5 4.4% 54.8 10.0%
S 6.2 5.0% 54.2 11.4%
T 6.3 5.1% 51.7 12.2%
V 8.9 7.1% 62.9 14.1%
W 3.4 2.8% 87.2 3.9%
X 6.6 5.3% 54.3 12.1%
Y 3.8 3.0% 42.3 8.9%
Z 7.1 5.7% 85.9 8.3%
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Table 3 shows that NPUs E, M, and B have most total HIN street miles. Normalization by total 
street miles within each NPU shows that NPUs E, L, and V have the highest percentage of 
streets that fall on the High-Injury Network.  
 
While the High-Injury Network impacts different NPUs and City Council Districts unevenly, lower 
income and higher minority census block groups are more likely to be exposed to the High-
Injury Network, compared to the city as a whole. Socioeconomic information from block groups 
with High-Injury Network streets were compared to block groups with no High-Injury Network 




Income White Black 
With HIN $38,391 35.02% 57.22% 
Without HIN $63,818 48.29% 44.99% 
Table 4. Block groups with HIN streets compared to those without by income and race  
 
Table 4 shows that block groups without HIN streets have significantly higher incomes than 
block groups with High-Injury Network streets. In addition, block groups with HIN streets have 
high a higher percentage of black residents. While these data are based on survey estimates 
and include some margin of error, they nonetheless indicate that exposure to the High-Injury 
Network disproportionately impacts black and lower-income Atlantans.  
 
 SOV Carpool 
Public 









With HIN 66.39% 7.29% 11.11% 0.74% 5.49% 2.10% 16.05% 
Without HIN 75.61% 6.53% 6.43% 0.77% 1.82% 1.37% 8.77% 
Table 5. Block groups with HIN streets compared to those without by workers’ commute mode and vehicle ownership  
 
In addition, Table 5 shows that workers in neighborhoods with HIN streets are more likely to 
commute by public transportation or walking, and less likely to commute via personal vehicle. 
Households in such block groups are also more likely to lack access to personal vehicles 
altogether. These data explain, in part, why more severe and fatal injuries occur in these Atlanta 
neighborhoods—those walking or taking public transportation are more vulnerable users of 
Atlanta’s streets, lacking safety protections of those travelling by personal vehicle.  
 
The figure below provides further illustration of how the High-Injury Network correlates with 
income. It shows roughly two-thirds of the High-Injury Network intersecting or adjacent to block 
groups with a median household income of less than $55,000. In fact, less than 1 mile of the 
High-Injury Network is located in the very top income category. A bivariate correlation between 
miles of HIN streets within each block group and median household income produced a 
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Pearson Correlation of -.281 (with significance at the .01 level—indicating that the total length of 
a block group’s HIN streets is slightly and inversely correlated with income. In other words, 
higher median incomes are slightly correlated with lower miles of HIN streets.  
 
 





Similar analyses were conducted looking at block groups’ racial, commuting, and vehicle 
ownership characteristics. Figure 17 below shows the HIN as it correlates with each block 
group’s percentage of minority population. It shows that much of the High-Injury Network runs 
through block groups that have minority populations of greater than 90%. A bivariate correlation 
of percent minority population and length of HIN streets produced a Pearson Correlation of .252 
(with significance at the .01 level). This result indicates a block group’s percent minority 
population is slightly correlated with the amount of HIN streets within its borders—as its percent 
minority population increases, so does the length of its HIN streets.  
 
 




Figures 18 and 19. Atlanta’s High-Injury Network by Workers’ Primary Commute Mode (left) and Percentage of Households with No 
Vehicle Available (right).  
 
Figures 18 and 19 above show the relationship between the city’s High-Injury Network and 
block groups by commuting mode and vehicle ownership. Figure 18 (left) shows that the vast 
majority of the High-Injury Network is located in block groups with higher rates of workers 
commuting by biking, walking, and taking transit. Figure 19 (right) shows that the High-Injury 
Network is concentrated in block groups with higher percentages of households with no vehicle 
available. Correlation between the length of HIN streets and percentage of workers commuting 
by biking, walking, and taking transit produced a Pearson Correlation of .269 (with significance 
at the .01 level). This result indicates that a slight correlation exists between miles of High-Injury 
Network within a block group and the percentages of workers commuting via biking, walking or 
taking transit. A similar correlation was shown between miles of High-Injury Network and the 
percentage of households with no vehicle available (.268 with significance at the .01 level).  
 
Overall, slight statistical correlations were shown between amount of HIN streets and a given 
block group’s percent minority population, percentage of commuters walking, biking, or taking 
transit, and percentage of households with no vehicle available. A slight inverse correlation was 
shown between miles of HIN within a block group and its median household income.  
 
What makes High-Injury Network streets different from other streets? 
Much of the Vision Zero literature identifies reducing vehicle speeds as a primary goal (Shahum, 
2015).  Given the number of injuries and fatalities attributed to the streets in the table above, it is 
likely that they see vehicle speeds that are higher than comparable streets. Unfortunately, data 
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about vehicles’ prevailing speeds is not readily available. The socioeconomic data shown above 
also indicate that these streets likely see higher pedestrian volumes. 
 
One might also assume that vehicle volumes on HIN streets distinguish them from non-HIN 
streets. While vehicle volumes play a role (Moreland Avenue SE, Lee Street SW, and Hollowell 
Parkway NW see vehicle volumes near or in excess of 20,000 cars per day), they are not the 
sole determining factor. It is true that low volume, neighborhood streets are less likely to be 
identified as a HIN street. But streets like Martin Luther King Jr Drive SW and Joseph E Boone 
Boulevard NW see volumes of 9000 and 5400 vehicles per day, respectively, and yet are 
identified as two of the worst ten streets in terms of their weighted injury score.  
 
Additional research and data collection should target HIN streets to better identify the 
characteristics that distinguish them from non-HIN streets. Among other factors, research 
should consider prevailing and posted speeds, vehicle volumes, pedestrian/cyclists volumes, 
number of lanes, streetscape characteristics, and adjacent land use characteristics. 
 
The photos below provide an illustration of a typical cross-section for several of the top ten 
High-Injury Network streets. Countermeasures should be targeted to the unique conditions of 
each street and no one solution will apply to each individual case. The photos do however, 
provide some indication of which countermeasures may help minimize fatalities and severe 
injuries, and many improvements aimed at reducing vehicle speeds and providing better 
facilities for pedestrians, cyclists, and transit users are recommended here.  
 
 
Figure 16. Moreland Avenue SE 
 
Moreland Avenue sees some of the highest vehicle volumes of any street on the High-Injury 
Network. At the same time, other conditions make it an unwelcoming environment for other 
users: long distances between marked crosswalks make it difficult for pedestrians to cross 
Moreland Avenue safely; numerous curb cuts and driveways throughout the corridor make for 




Figure 17. 10th Street NW 
 
10th Street NW crosses over I75/I85 as it passes through Atlanta. Collisions are concentrated 
around adjacent intersections on 10th Street between the freeway off-ramp and Techwood 
Drive. Despite forming the northern boundary of Georgia Tech’s campus and an important 
connection to Midtown Atlanta no bicycle facilities, and minimal pedestrian facilities, exist on 
10th Street NW. 
 
 
Figure 18. Joseph E. Boone Boulevard NW 
 
Joseph E. Boone Boulevard is notable because of its relatively low vehicle volumes (between 
5000 and 6000 vehicles per day). Many other top ten HIN streets see much higher vehicle 
volumes. Other Atlanta streets not included on the High-Injury Network, like Ponce de Leon 
Ave, North Ave and Northside Drive see higher vehicle volumes as well. It’s likely that 
pedestrian volumes are much higher on Boone Boulevard and many nearby residents may rely 




Figure 19. Donald Lee Hollowell Parkway NW 
 
Like many other HIN streets, Hollowell Parkway sees high vehicle speeds and long distances 
between marked pedestrian crosswalks. Curb cuts and driveways are prevalent along the 
corridor and minimal facilities exist for pedestrians like lighting or buffers between the sidewalk 
and passing vehicles. 
 
 
Figure 20. Lee Street SW 
 
A typical cross-section of Lee Street SW features five lanes of fast-moving traffic. At the same 
time, many active commercial uses exist along the corridor. In addition, the West End Marta 










“Vision without funding is hallucination”  
- Chris Tomlinson, Executive Director, Georgia Regional Transportation 
Authority and State Road and Tollway Authority 
 
As defined by the numerous cities nationwide that have asserted Vision Zero goals, the purpose 
of a High-Injury Network is to identify the city streets that account for the vast majority of severe 
injuries and fatalities. While traffic fatalities are infrequent events, the distribution of such events 
across the city is not random. In Atlanta, roughly two-thirds of the streets that form the city’s 
High-Injury Network are found on the city’s south and west sides—areas of the city that also 
have higher minority populations, lower median household incomes, and lower rates of private 
vehicle ownership. For that reason, establishing a Vision Zero policy for the city is both a public 
health issue and an equity issue. 
 
One of the primary purposes of this analysis is to illustrate the need for a High-Injury Network 
and a broader Vision Zero policy that takes immediate steps to reduce the number of traffic-
related severe injuries and fatalities that occur on Atlanta’s streets. Establishing such a policy 
should also provide attention and resources to address the issue. Rather than viewing traffic-
related severe injuries and fatalities as unpredictable “accidents,” the network provides an 
accessible illustration of where such events occur, empowering leaders to prioritize targeted 
infrastructure improvements.  
 
Improving Outcomes 
While adopting a Vision Zero policy will provide much needed attention to the issue of traffic 
safety within the city, taking steps to improve outcomes requires infrastructure investments that 
will make Atlanta’s streets safer for all users. A Vision Zero policy and an accompanying High-
Injury Network will elevate traffic safety as a city priority and recommend locations for 
infrastructure investment. 
 
Future roadway improvements through Renew Atlanta along with regular maintenance 
performed by GDOT and the Department of Public Works should consider a street’s High-Injury 
Network status when determining project priority. Projects eligible for LCI funding through the 
Atlanta Regional Commission that include HIN streets should receive priority when applying for 
implementation funds.  
 
Exactly how the city’s High-Injury Network streets should be improved depends upon the 
specific site conditions, but the vast majority of Vision Zero cities identify vehicle speed as the 
single most important factor affecting crash outcomes. Existing conditions of each High-Injury 
Network street and recent crash reports should be reviewed by Renew Atlanta and DPW staff to 
identify needed improvements for each street with input from neighborhood leaders and 
residents. Community input can provide valuable data about close-calls, information that may 




Citing research by Tefft, many cities have taken steps to reduce vehicle speeds by lowering the 
speed limit and using tools like speed cameras, red-light cameras, along with targeted roadway 
and streetscape features like bulb-outs, neck-downs, and planting street trees that have been 
shown to discourage motorists’ from speeding.  
 
Improving the Network 
In addition to targeting investments to improve outcomes based on the existing High-Injury 
Network, the network itself can be improved through enhanced data collection and data quality 
assurance. As identified in this analysis, approximately 10% of crashes initially attributed to city 
streets lacked accurate severe injury and fatality data that required review of individual crash 
reports. Further, fatality data reported by the Governor’s Office of Highway Safety and provided 
by GEARS should be reconciled to provide a more accurate assessment of the traffic fatalities. 
Currently, the two resources show a disparity of approximately 200 fatalities, a difference staff at 
GOHS attributed to reporting officer error.  
 
While the Governor’s Office of Highway Safety Annual report is publicly available, access to 
GEARS data requires application authorization. Privacy concerns should certainly be taken into 
account, but transparency and public awareness about traffic safety would be improved if crash 
data were more accessible and available.  
 
Following the improvements shown in San Francisco’s HIN 2017 update, more accurate injury 
data should be collected from hospitals that identify injuries from unreported crashes and also 
provide a clinical assessment of injury severity, rather than relying on the reporting officer’s 
judgment.  
 
Regular updates to the High-Injury Network should be performed on a 1-2 year basis by city 
staff to ensure that the network incorporates the most recent crash data available. An improved 
network should also consider high-injury intersections, creating an additional resource to identify 
fatal and severe-injury crashes reported at intersections. 
 
Improving Vision Zero 
Vision Zero policies in the United States have grown out of local advocacy efforts, particularly 
within the bicycle and pedestrian advocacy communities. Where active and engaged 
communities exist, Vision Zero policies have followed. But efforts to improve traffic safety are 
needed across the country, as fatalities have reversed their downward trend in recent years, not 
just in places with strong bicycle and pedestrian advocacy efforts.  
 
In addition, Vision Zero cannot afford to ignore the vast majority of traffic fatalities that occur on 
interstates and freeways. Within the Atlanta city limits approximately 75% of all severe or fatal 
injury crashes occur on freeways and interstates. A high-injury network for city streets offers 
targeted locations for improvements, but without accounting for interstate collisions Vision Zero 






While cities across the United States have embraced the goals of Vision Zero to reduce traffic 
fatalities and severe injuries on city streets, Atlanta has yet to follow suit, even as traffic fatalities 
in Georgia have increased in recent years. An important step in pursuit of reducing traffic deaths 
is identifying where fatalities and severe injuries occur.  
 
This analysis has identified the 84 streets that account for 88% of fatalities and 59% of severe 
injuries within the City of Atlanta from 2014-2016. In addition, this analysis showed that 10 
streets, despite constituting only 3% of the city’s street network, account for one third of all 
traffic-related fatalities. By creating a High-Injury Network, this analysis shows that traffic-related 
fatalities in Atlanta are not random and unpredictable--in fact, they are concentrated on 
relatively few streets.  
 
This analysis provides city leaders and neighborhood advocates a template for where 
infrastructure improvements should be targeted to reduce the incidence of traffic fatalities and 
severe injuries. As research has shown, reducing vehicle speeds can often make the difference 
between life and death. The streets identified here should receive priority when it comes to 
implementing countermeasure investments aimed at reducing vehicle speeds. Along with street 
design countermeasures, enforcement should target driver behaviors that most often result in 
traffic fatalities and severe injuries. In order to do so, changes to state law which currently 
handicaps valuable traffic safety enforcement mechanisms must be reconsidered. 
 
In addition to the goal of Vision Zero itself, Sweden offers another important lesson to U.S. cities 
and states. If Vision Zero considers only the fatalities and severe injuries that occur on local 
streets, we are ignoring the thousands of deaths that occur on freeways and interstates every 
year. To do so requires Vision Zero efforts to step beyond the largely urban bike and pedestrian 
advocacy groups where it has taken root, to take a regional perspective and build new 
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